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ABSTRACT
Mobile money holds great financial inclusion promise,
but also poses financial integrity challenges. The Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)—the intergovernmental global
anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist
financing (CTF) standard-setting body—expressed support
for financial inclusion and mobile money as a means to
decrease the use of non-transparent cash in many
developing countries. In February 2012, FATF adopted a
new revised set of standards. This Article considers the
impact of these new standards on mobile money models in
developing countries. It highlights aspects of the new
standards that would facilitate innovative mobile money
models, but also points to questions and challenges. The
new standards are generally more facilitative of new
financial services models for the unbanked and
underbanked, but a number of key questions and
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implementation challenges remain. These include mobile
money-related privacy and cyber-crime concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
The international anti-money laundering (AML) and counterterrorist financing (CTF) standards set by the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) directly and indirectly guide the design of key
elements of financial service delivery models. 1 In the past few
years, as an increasing number of countries adopted financial
inclusion policies, it became evident that interpretations of these
standards were negatively impacting initiatives to provide viable
and appropriate financial services to consumers. 2 In 2011 the
1

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM &
PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2012), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%
20Recommendations%20(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May
%202012%20web%20version.pdf [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS].
2
Hennie Bester et al., Implementing FATF Standards in Developing
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FATF adopted a guidance paper providing greater clarity about
ways to align financial inclusion and sound AML/CTF policies. In
February 2012, FATF’s support for financial inclusion was taken a
few steps further when it adopted a new revised set of standards. 3
This Article focuses on the impact of these new standards on
mobile money models in developing countries. It highlights
aspects of the new standards that would facilitate innovative
mobile money models, but also points to questions and challenges.
The current AML/CTF standards framework in relation to
mobile money is best understood against the backdrop of the pre2012 position. This Article therefore begins with a brief overview
of the tensions between the FATF standards and innovative
financial inclusion models.
I. THE FATF AND ITS STANDARDS
The FATF is an intergovernmental body that sets global AML,
CTF, and proliferation financing (financing of weapons of mass
destruction in contravention of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions) (PF) standards. These standards, known as the FATF
Recommendations, provide countries with benchmarks for AML,
CTF, and PF laws, service provider practices, and international
cooperation in criminal matters. The standards outline acts that
every country should criminalize to meet the FATF objectives, and
the client due diligence (CDD) measures that financial institutions
should adopt to mitigate and respond to risks of money laundering
(ML) and terror financing (TF) abuse. These CDD measures
include identifying and verifying the identity of every client,
monitoring the client’s transactions for unusual or suspicious
activities, and reporting this information to a national financial
intelligence unit.
Countries and Financial Inclusion: Findings and Guidelines (World Bank First
Initiative, Final Report, 2008), available at http://www.cenfri.org/documents/
AML/AML_CFT%20and%20Financial%20Inclusion.pdf.
3
FATF, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011) [hereinafter FATF
2011 GUIDANCE], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/
images/AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf.
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Despite its limited membership—by 2012 FATF had 34
countries and two regional organizations as members—the FATF
has been tremendously successful in positioning its standards as
global standards: more than 180 countries endorse the FATF
standards. 4 This is remarkable, given that the FATF was created as
a temporary task team in 1989 and has been operating under
temporary mandates since its formation. 5 One of the factors 6
underlying the FATF’s success as a standard-setting body is its
system of mutual evaluation of compliance with the standards,
coupled with indirect economic penalties for non-compliance. The
compliance system extends to non-members. Non-compliance can
expose a country to countermeasures by compliant countries and
their financial institutions. In practice, these countermeasures mean
that transactions and business relationships with persons from such
jurisdictions are closely scrutinized. These countermeasures add to
the costs of doing business with such countries, slow down the
pace of transactions, and in many cases may even lead to a
termination of business relationships. 7 The FATF’s name-andshame campaign and the threat of economic penalties were
sufficient not only to move countries towards compliance, but also
to ensure that smaller regulators and many financial institutions
reacted by adopting overly conservative rules and practices. 8
In the past years, increasing evidence emerged that FATF4

FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 7. The fact that major
countries such as India, Russia, and China endorsed the FATF
Recommendations and amended their laws to meet the standards before gaining
membership in the body bears testimony to the weight and impact of this body.
5
The FATF’s current mandate was set in 2012 and will continue to 2020.
6
Other factors—including its network of FATF-style regional bodies that
provide non-FATF member countries limited opportunity to participate in and
provide input into its processes, as well as the FATF’s range of observer
bodies—also increase ownership of, and support for, their standards.
7
INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT): REPORT ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM, 83-84 (2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/051111.pdf.
8
Luis Urrutia Corral, FATF President at the XVII Caribbean Financial
Action Task Force Council of Ministers Meeting (Nov. 5, 2010),
available
at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/documents/repositoire/
reinforcingtheglobalamlcftstructure.html.
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based rules and the conservative mindset of regulators were
impeding innovative financial services models and channels.
Transformational mobile money models, for instance, require a
regulatory framework that allows accounts to be opened via mobile
phones without contact with the service provider’s employees.
Non-face-to-face engagement gives rise to identity fraud risks.
These risks are higher in developing countries that lack national
identification frameworks or other means to verify the identity of
customers easily and securely. Furthermore, mobile money
channels rely on large networks of agents, third-party service
deliverers, and ATMs to provide cash-in and cash-out points. This
introduces ML/FT risks and complicates the reporting of unusual
and suspicious transactions. Regulators in many countries reacted
with unease to proposed business models, concerned that the FATF
may frown on the level of risk that such a model introduced. These
concerns slowed down the design of appropriate regulatory
frameworks for mobile money. 9
The FATF’s initial response was to defend its standards and to
blame inappropriate, conservative responses on national
regulators. 10 The FATF pointed out that many of the concerns
could be addressed if regulators applied a “risk-based approach”
(RBA). The FATF’s 2003 Recommendations allowed countries
and financial institutions to implement an RBA in relation to
certain aspects of the AML/CTF framework. In terms of the
FATF’s RBA, countries are allowed to exclude activity from
9

See Louis de Koker, Money Laundering Control and Suppression of
Financing of Terrorism: Some Thoughts on the Impact of Customer Due
Diligence Measures on Financial Exclusion, 13 J. OF FIN. CRIME 26 (2006);
Jennifer Isern & Louis de Koker, AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial Inclusion
and Integrity (Consultative Grp. to Assist the Poor, Focus Note No. 56, 2009),
available at http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.37862/; World Savings
Banks Inst., Anti-Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism Rules
and the Challenge of Financial Inclusion (World Savings Banks Inst., Position
Paper Doc. 0565/09, 2009), available at http://www.wsbi.org/uploadedFiles/
Position_papers/0565%20updated.pdf; PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN ET AL.,
PROTECTING MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES: GLOBAL POLICY
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS (2011) [hereinafter CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING
MOBILE MONEY].
10
See, e.g., Paul Vlaanderen, FATF President, Speech at the ESAAMLG
9th Council of Ministers Meeting (Aug. 21, 2009).
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AML/CTF regulation where the activity was limited and posed a
low level of ML/TF 11 risk. Institutions were urged to consider
adopting an RBA in terms of which customers, transactions, and
services were divided into high-, standard-, and low-risk bands.
Enhanced due diligence was required in cases where a high risk
was identified. In cases where low risk was assessed, regulators
could allow, and institutions could consider employing, simplified
due diligence measures.
While the basic principles of an RBA were clear, there was
little agreement about appropriate risk assessment and risk
mitigation measures and the extent to which an RBA could be
implemented. Concern that the FATF may disagree with a
particular interpretation and may list a country as non-compliant
impeded the implementation of robust RBA frameworks in many
smaller countries. In 2007 the FATF began to issue guidance on
the RBA for regulated institutions, professions, and businesses. 12
The guidance was helpful, but focused mainly on the identification
and mitigation of higher ML-risk; it shed little light on the
management of low-risk scenarios and an RBA in relation to TF
risk. 13 Financial inclusion models typically focus on small, lowvalue transactions. If they could be classified as a “low risk”
transaction, many potential clients could be serviced despite their
lack of formal identification documentation.
In 2010 the FATF, under the Mexican presidency, recognized
that regulators required more certainty before they would take
11

FATF refers to “ML/TF risk” but, as discussed in Section II.A, the RBA
does not fully extend to TF risk. It is also important to note that the RBA does
not extend to PF risk.
12
See e.g., FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES (2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20and%20Procedu
res.pdf [hereinafter FATF 2007 GUIDANCE].
13
Louis de Koker, Identifying and Managing Low Money Laundering Risk:
Perspectives on FATF’s Risk-Based Guidance, 16 J. OF FIN. CRIME 334 (2009)
[hereinafter de Koker, Identifying]; Louis de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money
Laundering, Combating of Financing of Terror and Financial Inclusion:
Questions to Consider when FATF Standards are Clarified, 18 J. OF FIN. CRIME
361 (2011) [hereinafter de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering].
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bolder action to implement an RBA that would support financial
inclusion. Following a consultative process, the FATF issued a
non-binding guidance paper on financial inclusion in 2011.14
These developments were not only the result of increased
international support for financial inclusion, but were also linked to
increased FATF concern about the integrity risk of financial
exclusion (i.e., the risk that persons may not use the formal
financial system and thereby limit the reach and effectiveness of
AML/CFT controls to mitigate financial integrity risks in the
economy as a whole).
The FATF’s financial inclusion guidance paper highlighted
steps that countries could take to align financial inclusion and
AML/CFT policies. The guidance paper also listed various country
examples without necessarily endorsing those as FATF-compliant.
The discussions that led to the adoption of the guidance paper
informed the drafting of the revised FATF Recommendations that
were adopted in February 2012. Unlike the guidance paper, the
Recommendations are binding and hierarchically superior to
guidance papers. It is therefore expected that the financial
inclusion paper will be revisited to clarify some aspects and ensure
that the guidance reflects the current Recommendations. During
the course of 2012 the FATF will also revisit its mutual evaluation
methodology. This methodology guides the country reviewers
when they produce a country compliance report in relation to the
FATF standards. Regulators will study the new methodology with
interest as it will set out the questions that country assessors have
to ask. These questions are often of greater relevance to the design
of compliant regulatory models than the broad statements of the
Recommendations themselves. It is expected that the measure to
evaluate appropriate risk-based responses will feature prominently
in the new methodology.
With this brief background, this Article turns its attention to
aspects of the new revised Recommendations that are particularly
relevant to mobile money.

14

FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3.
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II. 2012 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS:
MOBILE MONEY PERSPECTIVES
A. Introduction
The 2012 Recommendations are revised Recommendations.
They are in essence refined versions of the AML
Recommendations that were initially adopted in 1990 and revised
extensively in 2003, as well as the FATF’s Special
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing that it adopted from
2001. The intention was not to effect a radical change, but rather to
clarify the existing Recommendations, strengthen their
consistency, and address issues that lowered compliance levels of
countries. While the texts of many Recommendations were not
changed, the Recommendations were restructured and refined. The
forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the nine
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing were
consolidated into a single text of forty Recommendations,
accompanied by an expanded glossary and interpretive notes to
key Recommendations. As a result, the numbering of the
Recommendations changed (for example, the text of former
Recommendation 5 that addresses CDD is now found in
Recommendation 10) and some of the text of a few
Recommendations was moved to the interpretative notes.
Examples were added to the glossary and the interpretative notes to
explain aspects of the standards. These examples are not
mandatory but merely illustrative.
In 2008 the FATF’s mandate was expanded to address [full
name] (PF). The 2012 Recommendations, unlike their
predecessors, therefore explicitly address proliferation and require
countries to implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating
to the prevention, suppression, and disruption of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and its financing. 15 These resolutions
target proliferation activities of specific states, for example through
targeted financial sanctions. The resolutions also aim to prevent
15

FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 13 (Rec. 7).
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non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, for
example by requiring criminalization of acts such as the
manufacture, acquisition, use, or transport of nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons, including the financing of such activities. The
FATF’s focus on proliferation is, however, not well defined. The
FATF’s guidance focuses mainly on PF, but the wording of the key
anti-proliferation recommendation, Recommendation 7, extends it
to also include broader anti-proliferation measures in terms of the
UNSCRs. In addition, the concept of “PF” itself is quite broad; and
the FATF has not agreed on a working definition for its own
purposes. 16 Clarity is important because regulators and regulated
entities, including mobile money providers, are expected to meet
the FATF standards on AML/CTF as well as PF.
The RBA is a particularly prominent and now mandatory
feature of the 2012 Recommendations. This approach is of key
importance to mobile money and other financial inclusion
initiatives.
B. The 2012 RBA Principles
Recommendation 1 addresses risk assessment and the RBA
principles that countries and institutions should implement.
The RBA is now mandatory for countries and institutions, but
it is important to note that its application is limited to specific
aspects of the AML/CTF framework. It can be used to expand or
contract the regulatory sphere or to determine the nature of CDD
measures to be implemented in respect of specific client, products
or services. However, it cannot be used to argue that a country’s
overall ML/TF risk is so low that it does not need to criminalize
ML or TF. The RBA furthermore only extends to aspects of
ML/TF, but leaves PF untouched.
The cornerstone of the RBA is risk assessment. Under
Recommendation 1 countries are expected to “identify, assess and
understand” their ML/TF risks. That assessment will then inform
appropriate risk mitigation measures. Countries should apply an
RBA to ensure that the risk mitigation measures are commensurate
16

FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1.
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with the risks identified. Countries should also require their
AML/CTF-regulated institutions to undertake risk assessments to
mitigate their institutional ML/TF risks. Those institutional risk
assessments should in turn be informed by the country’s risk
assessment. Institutions should furthermore be required to adopt an
RBA when they determine the extent of their CDD measures.
Where countries identify higher risks, they should adopt
enhanced risk mitigation measures to ensure that the risks are
adequately addressed. Where countries identify lower risks, they
may—in strictly limited circumstances and where there is a proven
low risk of ML/TF—elect not to impose AML/CFT obligations on
institutions and businesses that should otherwise be regulated.
They may also allow regulated businesses to implement simplified
CDD in respect of low-risk clients, products and services.
Simplified measures are, however, optional and conditional, while
enhanced measures are mandatory where risks are high. In
addition, the FATF has been cautious to ensure that country RBAs
do not undermine key features of the AML/CTF system. The
FATF has therefore set specific CDD measures in relation to types
of clients, relationships, and activities that it deems as posing a
universally high risk. The FATF does not allow countries to adjust
that rating or the required risk mitigation measures even if certain
types of clients, relationships, and activities pose a lower risk in a
particular national context. Politically exposed persons 17 and
money or value transfer services are examples of customers and
activities with set measures that should be applied.
The national RBA is mirrored in the RBA that is envisaged at
an institutional level. Institutions must be required to assess their
ML/TF risks and adopt prescribed or enhanced risk mitigation
measures where risk is assessed or indicated as high. If the risk
assessment presents an “adequate analysis” of risk, 18 regulators
17

Politically exposed persons (PEPs) are generally defined as people who
are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions by a foreign country,
for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior
government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state-owned
corporations, or important political party officials. PEPs, their family members,
and close business associates may pose a corruption risk.
18
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 64.
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may permit institutions to adopt simplified measures where risks
are assessed as low; however, simplified measures are not
appropriate when there is a suspicion of ML/TF. 19
The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10 provides far
greater clarity than before about the RBA in relation to lower-risk
products. The Interpretative Note lists non-binding examples of
potentially lower-risk scenarios in relation to customers, country
and regions and products, services and delivery channels. One of
the examples is “financial products or services that provide
appropriately defined and limited services to certain types of
customers, so as to increase access for financial inclusion
purposes.” 20
The Interpretative Note also provides more guidance regarding
simplified CDD measures. Examples of possible measures include:
verification of the customer and the beneficial owner identity after
the establishment of the business relationship (for instance when
transaction amounts exceed a defined monetary threshold); a
reduction in the frequency of customer identification updates; or
limited on-going monitoring of low-value transactions. The
measures adopted must however be commensurate with the lowerrisk factors. Whenever there is a suspicion of money laundering or
terrorist financing, or where “specific higher-risk scenarios
apply,” 21 such simplified measures are not appropriate.
The meaning of “specific higher-risk scenarios,” 22 is not quite
clear. The phrase only appears in the discussion of low risk and
simplified due diligence; it is not used elsewhere in the text of the
Recommendations. Apparently the intention was to refer to the
specific customers and activities where additional measures are
required by the Recommendations, in other words, the matters
addressed by Recommendations 12 to 16: politically exposed
persons (PEPs); correspondent banking; money or value transfer
services; and new technologies and wire transfers. The specific
rules and procedures envisaged in these Recommendations
therefore must be applied and cannot be simplified on the strength
19

Id. at 31.
Id. at 64.
21
Id. at 66.
22
Id.
20

176

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:3

of an institutional RBA, even though the institutional risk levels
relating to those matters are very low. One implication is that
mobile money providers should have appropriate risk management
systems to determine whether a customer is a foreign PEP (one of
the measures stipulated in Recommendation 12) and cannot
dispense with such measures merely because their risk assessment
reflects their PEP risk exposure as very low. This limitation
compels providers to adopt risk mitigation measures that are
disproportionate to the actual risk and runs counter to the
regulatory principle of proportionality. 23
Although the revised Recommendations improved the
coherency of the RBA framework, some inconsistencies remain.
Institutions are for instance compelled to undertake CDD in
respect of business relationships, irrespective of value, but are not
compelled to implement these measures in relation to non-accountbased occasional transactions under US$/€15,000. Where an
institution assesses its low-value account-based product as posing a
low risk of abuse, it is still required to implement CDD measures,
although they may be simplified. Many low-value financial
inclusion accounts may never have a total amount of US$/€15,000
processed through them. Yet, the framework covers those
accounts. Meanwhile a single transaction that involves
US$/€14,000 is not required to be subjected to the FATFenvisaged CDD measures.
The RBA has furthermore not been extended to all CDD
aspects. For example, it does not extend to the duty to determine
whether clients were designated under UNSCRs for CTF purposes.
This determination must be made irrespective of the degree of risk
of doing business with a designated person under the name or
names identified in terms of the UNSCR schemes. 24 The PF
measures have also been excluded from the RBA. Institutions will
23

Global Standard-Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion for the Poor:
Toward Proportionate Standards and Guidance (Global P’ship for Fin.
Inclusion, White Paper, 2011), available at http://www.gpfi.org/knowledgebank/publications/global-standard-setting-bodies-and-financial-inclusion-poor.
24
The FATF view is that compliance with sanctions (i.e., identification of
clients as designated persons for TF or WMD purposes) is not a function of risk.
See FATF 2007 GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 8.
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therefore need to perform standard name-matching tests to
compare client names with the listed names of UNSCR-designated
persons as well as PEPs, even though their chances of transacting
with such a person are assessed as very slim. 25
Despite these inconsistencies, the FATF’s RBA can be very
helpful in removing FATF-related barriers to financial inclusion.
Underlying this approach however, is an assumption that
institutions will assess risks correctly and adopt simplified CDD
when risks are assessed as low. The large-scale closure of accounts
of Money Service Businesses by banks in response to often
unfounded risk concerns has shown that this is not necessarily the
case. 26 Conservative institutions tend to overestimate risk and
avoid it or adopt over-designed controls. 27 Conduct of regulators
and supervisors, such as harsh compliance enforcement action,
may exacerbate this behavior. Adoption of simplified CDD
measures is optional, but if institutions fail to do so when
appropriate, financial inclusion can be undermined and financial
exclusion risk would rise. Regulators have furthermore indicated
that they are reluctant to intervene and force adoption of simplified
measures where institutions decide that more stringent measures
should be applied. It will therefore be vital for regulators and
supervisors to create environments where institutions can assess
and respond correctly to the different risk levels.
C. Other Relevant Measures
A number of other Recommendations are also relevant to
mobile money.
Recommendation 15, for example, requires countries and
financial institutions to identify and assess the ML/TF risks that
25

See Section III.B for questions regarding the value of these processes
when CDD is simplified.
26
Bester et al., supra note 2, at 158-62.
27
Louis de Koker & John Symington, Conservative Compliance Behaviour:
Drivers of Conservative Compliance Responses in the South African Financial
Services Industry (FinMark Trust, 2011), available at http://www.mfw4a.org/
documents-details/conservative-compliance-behavior-drivers-of-conservativecompliance-responses-in-the-south-african-financial-services-industry.html.
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may arise in relation to: (a) the development of new products and
business practices, including new delivery mechanisms; and (b) the
use of new or developing technologies for both new and preexisting products. This recommendation tightens the wording of its
2003 predecessor by linking it directly to the RBA. 28 Although this
Recommendation is relevant to mobile money, it is largely
superfluous in view of the more comprehensive and fundamental
obligation of countries and financial institutions to assess all their
ML/TF risks and to manage them appropriately.
The Recommendations addressing money or value transfer
service (MVTS) and wire transfers are of greater relevance. An
MVTS is defined in the glossary as referring to financial services
that involve the acceptance of cash, checks, other monetary
instruments, or other stores of value and the payment of a
corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary by means
of a communication, message, transfer, or through a clearing
network to which the MVTS provider belongs. Mobile money is an
MVTS for purposes of the FATF standards. 29
In terms of Recommendation 14, providers of MVTS must be
licensed or registered and subject to effective systems for
monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant FATF
measures. 30 An exception is a financial institution that is already
licensed and registered as such, allowed to offer MVTS and
subject to the full range of applicable FATF measures. 31 Mobile
money account providers that are not licensed as such, for example
28

See FATF, FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Rec. 8) (2003), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf. In one respect a key measure of
support for mobile money was weakened. The 2003 Recommendations urged
countries “to encourage the development of modern and secure techniques of
money management that are less vulnerable to money laundering.” Id. at 9 (Rec.
20). This has now fallen away.
29
As in the 2003 set, MVTS as well as issuers and managers of means of
payment (e.g., credit and debit cards, checks, traveler’s checks, money orders
and bankers’ drafts, electronic money) are also defined as “financial
institutions” for purposes of the FATF standards.
30
This is echoed in Recommendation 26, but that Recommendation requires
regulation and supervision to ensure compliance with national AML/CFT
standards.
31
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 69.
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a telecommunications company, should therefore be licensed or
registered to deliver such services. Any natural or legal person
working as an agent for an account provider should also be
licensed or registered by a competent authority, or the MVTS
provider should maintain a current list of its agents accessible by
competent authorities in the countries in which the MVTS provider
and its agents operate. 32 Those agents should be included in the
AML/CFT programs of providers and should also be monitored for
compliance with those programs. 33
MVTS providers are furthermore required to comply with the
relevant requirements of Recommendation 16 in the countries in
which they operate, whether directly or through their agents. 34
Recommendation 16 requires MVTS providers to include specific
and accurate originator (sender) information, and required
beneficiary information, in their wire transfers messages, and to
ensure that the information remains with the wire transfer or
related message throughout the payment chain. They must
furthermore ensure that they can take freezing action or prevent
prohibited transactions when required by relevant UNSCRs on
CFT or PF. 35
While Recommendation 16 gives rise to extensive general
compliance obligations, 36 it alleviates the overall compliance
32

Id. at 17 (Rec. 14).
Id.
34
There are some exceptions for example payments for goods or services
using a credit, debit or prepaid card for the purchase of goods or services, as
long as the card number accompanies all transfers flowing from the transaction.
Person-to-person transfers using those cards as a payment system are, however,
included in Recommendation 16. See id. at 70.
35
Confusingly the text of Recommendation 16 makes explicit reference to
CFT only. However, it refers to sanctions against “designated persons and
entities” and the definition of this concept in the glossary extends to targeted
financial sanctions to support the control of WMD. See Section III.B for some
practical difficulties that may arise regarding freezing of assets when
identification requirements are simplified.
36
For example, cross-border wire transfers “should always contain: the
name of the originator; the originator account number where such an account is
used to process the transaction; the originator’s address, or national identity
number, or customer identification number, or date and place of birth; the name
of the beneficiary; and the beneficiary account number where such an account is
33
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burden by means of a few pragmatic exceptions and rules, for
example:


Ordering financial institutions need not verify the identity
of both parties to the transfer service. However, they must
verify the sender’s identity and information while receiving
institutions must verify the information of the beneficiary.



Domestic wire transfers should also include extensive
originator information, unless this information can be made
available to the beneficiary financial institution and
appropriate authorities by other means. In that case, the
institution need only include the account number or a
unique transaction reference number that will enable the
transaction to be traced back to the originator or the
beneficiary.



Countries may adopt simplified identification requirements
in relation to cross-border wire transfers involving amounts
below US$/€1,000. 37 Simplified measures may allow party
information to be limited to the name of the originator; the
name of the beneficiary; and an account number for each,
or a unique transaction reference number. This information
need not be verified, unless there is a suspicion of ML/TF,
in which case, each relevant financial institution should
verify the information pertaining to its customer. 38

From a mobile money perspective, these rules and exceptions
are especially helpful in relation to domestic, low-value wire
transfers. However, as transaction values increase, the exceptions

used to process the transaction. In the absence of an account, a unique
transaction reference number should be included which permits traceability of
the transaction.” FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 71.
37
The 2012 duty is more onerous than before. In terms of the previous
standards, wire transfers below US$/€1,000 could be exempted from CDD
requirements. Id.
38
It is not clear how this will be communicated between the two institutions
or how the ordering institution will be able to comply, if they had no suspicion
when receiving the funds but the suspicion was formed by the receiving
institution.
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will no longer apply and the standard requirements will have to be
met.
The FATF standards also require service providers to report
transactions that are suspected of involving ML/TF to the national
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). 39 Where a mobile money
operator controls both the ordering and the beneficiary side of a
wire transfer, 40 the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 16
requires the operator to consider all the information received from
both the ordering and beneficiary sides to determine whether a
suspicious transaction report (STR) must be filed. The report
should be filed in any country affected by the suspicious wire
transfer, and relevant transaction information should be made
available to the FIU.
The record-keeping standards are also relevant to the mobile
money framework. Countries are required to ensure that financial
institutions maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records
on transactions, both domestic and international, in order to
provide transactional forensic information to law enforcement. 41
This duty extends to all records obtained through CDD measures,
such as copies or records of identification documents (e.g.,
passports, identity cards, driving licenses, or similar documents),
business correspondence, and internal notes on CDD in respect of
each client. The records must be kept for at least five years after
the business relationship comes to an end, or after the date of the
occasional transaction.
While record-keeping has been a standard FATF obligation
since 1990, it was broadened in 2012. Pre-2012, institutions were
required to keep CDD records up to date. This duty has now been
extended to documents collected under CDD processes. Financial
institutions are required to ensure that documents, data or
information collected under the CDD process is kept up to date and
relevant by undertaking reviews of existing records, particularly
for higher-risk categories of customers. 42 Valid identification
39

Recommendation 20 does not explicitly extend to PF transactions. FATF
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 19.
40
Id. at 73.
41
Id. at 15 (Rec. 11).
42
Id. at 66.
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documents with expiry dates may need to be reviewed in the future
to ensure that a copy of the current, unexpired document is on file.
South Africa, for example, extended this obligation in 2010 to
refugees. Refugees there obtain temporary government-issued
identification documentation. Banks were instructed to ensure that
refugee accounts are frozen when their identification document
expires and that they should only be unfrozen when the client
presents a new, valid temporary document. 43 In South Africa this
principle would also extend to other documents that have
temporary validity such as drivers’ licenses and passports that are
valid for fixed periods. A similarly strict interpretation of the
FATF duty to keep documents up to date and relevant will lead to
substantial increase in compliance obligations and potential
hardship for many clients.
With this brief overview of key mobile money AML/CTF
requirements under the new standards, this Article turns to risk
assessment and mitigation.
III. RISK IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND MITIGATION
The FATF’s RBA enables regulators and mobile money
providers to shape aspects of an AML/CTF risk control framework
to better align financial inclusion and financial integrity objectives.
A sound RBA is informed by risk assessments that present an
“adequate analysis of the risk.” 44 Proportional controls that
mitigate the risks must then be designed, implemented, monitored
and, where required, amended to manage the identified risks. Risk
assessments must be revisited to ensure that assessments remain
current and comprehensive. Superficially this may appear
relatively easy, but important questions and challenges arise.

43

Louis de Koker, Will RICA’s Customer Identification Data Meet AntiMoney Laundering Requirements and Facilitate the Development of
Transformational Mobile Banking in South Africa? (FinMark Trust, Exploratory
Note, 2010), available at http://www.cenfri.org/documents/Financial%
20inclusion/2010/RICA%20impact%20on%20financial%20inclusion_final.pdf.
44
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 64.
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A. Conceptual Uncertainties
The FATF has not yet been able to reach consensus about the
definition of risk. Given the RBA’s centrality to the new FATF
framework, the absence of a consensus about this key concept is
somewhat ironic. 45 From a practical perspective it undermines the
conceptual framework and uniformity required to ensure that
country and institutional risk assessments inform one another.
There are of course globally accepted definitions of risk. The
ISO 31000 (2009)/ISO Guide 73:2002, for example, define risk as
the “effect of uncertainty on objectives.” 46 But there is not full
agreement within the FATF that this definition is applicable to its
RBA.
To add to the confusion, the risk questions that AML/CFT
stakeholders pose may differ. Institutions often focus on ML/TF
abuses that may render them liable, for example, by exposing them
to fines for non-compliance with the law, or that may expose them
to reputational risk. This is often the case where compliance
officers lead the risk assessment processes. Regulators, on the
other hand, require institutions to invest money to assess the
likelihood of an abuse of their services or products for ML/TF
purposes. Some of these transactions may hold little or no risk of
direct negative financial impact on the institution and may even be
profitable for the institution. 47 In short, institutions are concerned
45

de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering, supra note 13, at 370.
“International risk management standards define risk as a function of the
likelihood of occurrence and the consequence of risk events, where likelihood of
occurrence is a function of the coexistence of threat and vulnerability. In other
words, risk events occur when a threat exploits vulnerability. Formally, R, a
jurisdiction’s level of ML risk, can be represented as: R = f [(T), (V)] x C, where
T represents threat, V represents vulnerability, and C represents consequence.
Accordingly, the level of risk can be mitigated by reducing the size of the
threats, vulnerabilities, or their consequences.” IMF, supra note 7, at 64.
47
The Australian regulator, for example, require reporting institutions to
have an AML/CTF program to identify, mitigate and manage the risk of money
laundering or terrorism financing that a reporting entity may reasonably face in
providing designated services at or through a permanent establishment in
Australia. See, e.g., Australian Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism
Financing Act § 84(2) (2006), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
C2012C00375/Html/Text#_Toc321138619.
46
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about the risk that employees may collude with criminals and
facilitate money laundering or commit other breaches of the law
that may render the institution liable or may cause damage to its
reputation. They are not necessarily as concerned about a
transaction that involves proceeds of crime of which its employees
were unaware and where reasonable controls could not have
prevented it. These transactions concern the regulator and the
policymaker but not necessarily the institution, as chances of legal
liability or reputational damage is small. While the institution may
undertake a comprehensive risk assessment, its natural concerns
and interests may skew the assessment.
Regulators may also have a more limited risk focus than often
assumed in FATF discussions. A regulator may impose controls to
keep proceeds of crime out of its regulated industry, despite the
fact that it may move tainted funds to another regulated industry—
where it becomes the concern of another regulator—or into the
grey economy or to a neighboring country.
Policymakers generally have a broader perspective, but
AML/CFT policymakers have not always been sensitive to the
potential of money moving out of the formal economy into the
informal economy or being trapped in that part of the economy.
The FATF has also not yet determined whether to focus on the
integrity of financial services or on the integrity of the economy,
non-financial and non-formal, as a whole. 48 Since 2001 it has
focused on informal remittances, but not to the same extent on
other informal financial services. Since 2011, however, it has
voiced its concern about financial exclusion risks of people being
forced or electing to transact using informal financial services,
thereby limiting the reach and effectiveness of AML/CTF controls.
Thus, the interplay between controls that preserve the integrity of
formal financial services and those that push criminal activity into
the underground economy requires far more FATF attention. This
is even more important given that the 2012 FATF framework also
extends to proceeds of tax crimes. The interplay between strict
FATF-related controls and the movement of money in and to the

48

de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering, supra note 13.
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shadow or underground economy requires more attention than it
received in the past.
Whether the assessment should gauge the risk of “substantial”
or “significant” abuse—and the meaning of these terms would be
debatable—or the risk of any abuse, however insignificant, has
also not been settled. Generally the focus in respect to ML is on
more significant abuse, measured by transactional value. More
attention is therefore given to high-value transactions. Lower-value
transactions, such as non-account-based transactions under
US$/€15,000, may not be subject to any customer due diligence
controls. The FATF, however, recognizes that small, low-value
transactions may be relevant from a TF perspective. 49 Two
observations are relevant in this regard: (1) What poses a low risk
from an ML perspective may not pose a low risk from a TF
perspective, and institutions can only simplify CDD measures if
both ML and TF risk levels are assessed as low; and (2) no
provider of mass transaction services can state with confidence that
the chances of processing one low-value transaction that indirectly
supports a terrorist is low, especially when the country has even
limited levels of TF risk. Statistically, the risk will increase as its
business grows. A risk assessment that focuses on the chances of
any TF abuse, however small, will therefore not tend to rate any
risk as low.
Given that national risk assessments have to inform industry
risk assessments and institutional risk assessments, the lack of
conceptual clarity and commonality complicates discussions. In
addition, the concept of “risk appetite” or “risk sensitivity” has not
been sufficiently raised. Assessors are required to assess risk and
to classify them into categories of “high” and “low” risk. That
classification depends heavily on the assessors’ view of risk and of
the benefit to be obtained when the risk is embraced. A person
with a low-risk appetite would not tend to classify any risks as low,
while one with a high-risk appetite would hold a different view.
The FATF examples provide some guidance as to potential lowrisk scenarios, but risk ratings depend very much on the context of
49

See FATF 2007 GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 8; de Koker, Identifying,
supra note 13, at 343-47; FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 19.
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the assessment and the examples are not absolute or binding.
Institutions cannot be expected to assess this risk correctly and
confidently without guidance from their governments, and in many
developing countries little guidance has been forthcoming.
B. Risk Assessment and Controls
Despite these uncertainties, a number of mobile money risk
assessment models were developed to assist regulators and
providers in undertaking risk assessments.
The World Bank, for example, identified four key ML/TF risk
factors in relation to mobile money: anonymity (anonymous
usage); elusiveness (ability to avoid the identification and tracing
of parties to the transaction); rapidity (the speed of transacting);
and poor oversight (limited regulation and supervision). 50 The
Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) uses a risk
assessment methodology constructed around these factors and
assesses ML/TF risks that may stem from customers, merchants
and retailers or agents, or that may stem from cross-border
functionality. 51 The FATF developed a risk matrix identifying risk
factors, risk mitigants, and potential risk levels in relation to new
payment methodologies, including mobile money. The work that
commenced in 2006 52 was further refined in 2010. 53 In 2010 the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also
produced a comprehensive mobile financial services matrix that
50

Pierre-Laurent Chatain et al., Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial
Services: Measures for Mitigating Risks from Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing 13 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 146, 2008), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAML/Resources/WP146_Web.pdf;
CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING MOBILE MONEY, supra note 9, at 37-38.
51
Marina Solin & Andrew Zerzan, Mobile Money: Methodology for
Assessing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks (Groupe Speciale
Mobile Ass’n, Discussion Paper, 2009), available at http://www.gsma.com/
developmentfund/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/amlfinal35.pdf.
52
FATF, REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2006), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Report%20on%20New%
20Payment%20Methods.pdf.
53
FATF, MONEY LAUNDERING USING NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2010),
available
at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%
20using%20New%20Payment%20Methods.pdf.
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includes an assessment of financial crime risks. 54
While these methodologies are helpful, they still need to be
applied sensibly in each country and in relation to specific products
in order to identify the relevant risks and to respond appropriately
to each. This exercise is complicated by the fact that risk control
measures themselves may produce risks that must be adequately
addressed. Client identification processes, for example, increase
the risk of data theft. In other cases they raise questions regarding
the sensibility of the standard control measures that institutions are
compelled to adopt.
For example, in a lower-risk context client identification may
be simplified and verification may be postponed. On the other
hand, service providers are required to scan names of clients
against UNSCR lists of terrorists and persons associated with
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Where a name match
occurs, the transaction must be frozen. An investigation must be
undertaken to determine whether the party to the transaction was
the party listed by the relevant UNSCR. If not, the money can be
released. Scanning and processes to ensure that such transactions
are frozen add compliance costs to the business model. These costs
may be disproportionate to the benefits in cases where simplified
identification and verification measures are adopted. In essence,
the benefit would be limited to the cases where a listed person uses
his or her listed name to conclude such a transaction. That would
be highly unlikely, especially as the simplified identification
measures may not be sufficiently robust to compel such a person to
use their actual name. Simplified identification measures also
increase costs to investigate cases where name-matching occurs.
The provider cannot undertake an appropriate background check
based on the client information that it holds to determine whether
or not it is a false match. The investigation itself may prove very
difficult in a developing country environment. An innocent
consumer would also bear some of the impact, having the
transaction frozen until it can be established that the match was
false. In essence, the measures will pose a burden for providers and
54

U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES RISK
MATRIX (2010), available at http://bizclir.com/galleries/publications/Mobile%
20Financial%20Services%20Risk%20Matrix%20July%202010.pdf.
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for customers whose names happen to match those of persons who
were listed, but it will not be effective to prevent the listed persons
from using the services.
A number of risk-control models suggest controlling the risks
introduced by simplified identification measures through enhanced
monitoring of transactions. Transactions are monitored to identify
unusual transaction patterns. Monitoring is more effective when
institutions know enough about their clients to identify when a
client acts contrary to his or her normal or expected pattern of
behavior. The less an institution knows about a client, the less
value standard-monitoring processes may produce. Closer
monitoring may in fact just generate longer lists of potentially
unusual or suspicious transactions that do not lend themselves to
further investigation.
Many standard low-risk controls, especially transaction and
balance limits, are based on assumptions that they lower the
usefulness of the product for ML or TF abuse. However, an
increasing number of cases are emerging where criminals are
patient and work in groups to abuse these products to launder
money. 55 While the incidence of abuse may therefore be higher
than anticipated, the total amounts involved in these abuses should
generally be far lower than amounts laundered through standard
and higher-risk products. The ML risk may therefore still be
regarded as low compared to other products, but whether the same
can be said of TF risk is unclear. 56 Simplified control measures,
however, tend to attract abuse; and it is realistic to expect that
abuse of these products will increase in future.
C. Risk Assessment and Cross-Border Services
It is challenging to undertake an assessment of a particular
product’s AML/CTF risk. The challenges multiply when the
mobile money model attempts to operate cross-border and the
assessment, and controls must satisfy different regulators working
55

Isern & de Koker, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing micro and nanostructuring, i.e. splitting large amounts of dirty money into small or very small
transactions). See also Section IV.A for the 2012 PostBank fraud.
56
See also Section III.A.
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within different national legal frameworks. In many cases the
countries may not share the same definition of ML/TF offenses.
The FATF provides a flexible framework allowing countries to
determine, for example, whether money laundering offenses can be
committed negligently or only intentionally and whether it extends
to proceeds of all crimes or only to proceeds of specific serious
offences. Legal differences such as these, combined with different
national crime and law enforcement environments, mean that a
product may be assessed as posing a low risk in one country if
offered only in that country, but may have a higher risk profile in
another country if it operates across borders.
Encouraging developments in this context are comprised in the
Southern African Development Community’s attempt to
coordinate the development of ML laws among its members to
support the development of cross-border financial services in the
region. 57 Greater legal uniformity will also support a regional RBA
approach.
IV. BROADER INTEGRITY RISKS
Much of the current integrity attention is devoted to ML/TF
risk assessment and mitigation. However, broader, non-ML/TFspecific financial integrity risks of mobile money should also
receive attention. This Article closes with a brief overview of some
concerns regarding cybercrime and surveillance.
A. Cybercrime
Mobile money uses high-technology channels that are designed
to be secure to the extent that the service provider can mitigate
risks. However, there are also risks that originate on the user side.
If the client fails to protect secure access details or if a virus infects
the phone, the client is exposed to risk. Viruses pose an increasing
risk as cheap smartphones spread through developing countries.
57

See S. AFR. DEV. CMTY., PROTOCOL ON FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 19
(ch. 8) (2006), available at http://www.sadc.int/files/2913/2634/9829/
PROTOCOL_ON_FINANCE_AND_INVESTMENT_-_18_AUGUST_2006FINAL.pdf.
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Ensuring that new users protect their access details and removing
viruses from phones in remote rural areas where technical
expertise is limited are challenging. This provides criminals and
terrorists with new ways to profit from crime and to disrupt
systems.
As mobile money networks and providers grow, employee risk
also increases. Low-value accounts of the South African PostBank
were, for example, targeted in a sophisticated theft on New Year’s
Day in 2012. Although facts are still emerging, it appears that an
organized crime group opened 103 small accounts in false names
over a long period. This was done despite the fact that PostBank
subjects all its clients to CDD processes before opening an
account. The criminals also bribed an employee who was able to
obtain security codes and could access the bank’s transactional
control systems to identify accounts with large balances. The
syndicate then raised the daily withdrawal limits on the false
accounts to about US$55,000 per day, transferred money from the
large accounts to the network of small accounts in false names and
over the course of three days withdrew about US$3 to US$4
million dollars from ATMs in more than 5,000 withdrawals in
different regions of South Africa.
Inside information is also essential in the schemes involving
Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) swap frauds. In these
schemes, fraudsters obtain sufficient details of a bank client who
operates his bank account via a mobile phone and fraudulently
request a SIM swap at the mobile phone provider. They use the
swapped SIM to intercept and divert the randomly generated
security passwords that are linked to the account. This enables
them to operate the client’s account and divert funds without the
client receiving account activity alerts from the bank. 58
Cybercrime is, of course, very relevant to the providers of
mobile money services. Mobile money services require a wide
range of stakeholders to cooperate closely. To prevent
vulnerabilities due to different security practices, standardization is
required. One example of security standardization is the model of
58

Hidden Price of a Banking Scam, OMBUDSMAN FOR BANKING SERVICES
NEWS & MEDIA RELEASES, July 20, 2009, available at http://www.obssa.co.za/
news/2009_0720_banking_scam.htm.
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the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council. The
Council was formed in 2006 by American Express, Discover
Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and
Visa Inc., to formulate open industry standards for global payment
security. 59 The Council has more than 600 global participating
organizations representing industry stakeholders around the
world. 60 The Council’s standards range from management of
security to technical matters regarding software and encryption.
While standards such as these are crucial for the secure
development of mass services, they challenge regulators to
understand and evaluate the standards and their implementation by
regulated institutions. They also require regulators to be vigilant to
ensure that standards and requirements are proportional and do not
unnecessarily limit market entry.
B. Privacy and Surveillance
One of the key objectives of the AML/CTF framework is to
ensure law enforcement access to financial information of clients.
While law enforcement and anti-crime social benefits of financial
transparency is recognized, 61 it is important to be sensitive to
potential abuse of financial information as well. An appropriate
framework must be in place to ensure that the global movement to
increase access to financial information is not abused by national
governments to increase their access to private information.
The FATF standards are not designed to protect client
information against inappropriate access and usage by government
59

About the PCI Security Standards Council, OFFICIAL PCI SECURITY
STANDARDS COUNCIL SITE, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org.
60
The Future of Money: How Mobile Payments Could Change Financial
Services: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit,
112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Troy Leach, Chief Tech. Officer, Payment
Card
Indus.
Sec.
Standards
Council
LLC),
available
at
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HHRG-112-BA-WStateTLeach-20120322.pdf.
61
See, e.g., Princess Máxima, U.N. Secretary General’s Special Advocate,
Address to the FATF Plenary (June 23, 2010), available at
https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/RESOURCES/GUIDELINES/keynot
e%20address%20by%20H%20R%20H%20Princess%20Máxima.pdf.
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agencies. This is not the purpose of these standards. However, if
the current move towards transparency of financial information to
government is not counter-balanced by appropriate controls, the
AML/CFT standards may give some governments an excuse to
invade privacy for their own political purposes.
This type of abuse is difficult to prove, but there are indications
that concern is justified. A number of allegations have been made
regarding selective implementation of AML/CTF laws against
political opponents or to pursue other policy objectives. 62 In
addition, many countries lack sufficient and effective protective
measures to prevent such abuse. The governance structures of
some FIUs, for example, are not sufficiently robust to protect them
from abuse for political purposes. The Egmont Group, a select
group of national FIUs, and the World Bank undertook a survey in
2008 to probe aspects of FIU governance. Sixty-five FIUs
participated in the survey, and the results provide grounds for
concern. 63 While many FIUs appear to meet basic good
62

“On the political level, two common problems frequently hinder efficient
implementation of AML/CFT regimes in post-communist countries. The first is
‘selective implementation’ – that is, using AML/CFT laws to target political
opponents. The other problem is ‘political risk.’ This means, governments and
individual decision-makers adopting strong AML/CFT measures take the risk of
being forced out of office by actors who prefer to maintain the unregulated
status quo. Certain cases in Central Asia may illustrate ‘selective
implementation.’” Elias Götz & Michael Jonsson, Political Factors Affecting
AML/CFT Efforts in Post-Communist Eurasia: The Case of Georgia, 12 J. OF
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 59, 68 (2009).
“Moreover, since the enactment of Chinese AML Provisions (2003), the
main victims were those destroyed underground banks in the coastal regions of
the Southeast China. Chinese critics claimed that the People’s Bank of China
was using AML legislations to assist state-owned commercial banks keeping
their monopolistic positions in the financial markets.” Jun Tang & Lishan Ai,
Combating Money Laundering in Transition Countries: The Inherent
Limitations and Practical Issues, 13 J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 215,
219 (2010). See also David Chaikin & Jason Sharman, APG/FATF AntiCorruption/AML/CFT 18-13, 69-72 (FATF/APG, Research Paper, 2007),
available at http://www.apgml.org/issues/docs/17/APG-FATF_Report_on_AntiCorruption_AML.pdf.
63
Louis de Koker, Applying Anti-Money Laundering Laws to Fight
Corruption, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN
CORRUPTION 351-52 (Adam Graycar & Russell G. Smith eds., 2011).
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governance requirements, a significant number do not meet these
requirements and may therefore be vulnerable to political
influence. For example, a significant number of the heads of FIUs
(for example, 46 percent of the heads of administrative FIUs) are
appointed by a minister, cabinet, or head of state. Additionally, 34
percent are appointed to fixed terms of office, while 62 percent do
not have fixed terms. In more than half of the respondent FIUs,
some other state body or judicial authority has access to the FIU’s
data holdings, while 62 percent reported that they can (or must)
disclose their findings or the results of their analyses to a superior
authority (for example a ministry, government, or supervisory
authority). It is encouraging that the new Recommendation 29 and
its Interpretive Note seek to strengthen the autonomy of an FIU
and the security and confidentiality of its information.
Improvements will however take time to effect and in some
countries may prove less effective than hoped.
In the mobile money context, the powerful access mechanisms
of the AML/CTF framework and relatively weak anti-abuse and
privacy protection mechanisms converge with the powerful datagenerating and capturing ability of mobile telecommunications.
Communication data reveal the views and social patterns of users.
Mobile phone handsets can act as tracking devices enabling the
tracing and location of users. Where the phone is used for financial
services, the data is enriched by the payment and spending pattern
of the user. In the past few years, an increasing number of
developing countries imposed SIM-card registration requirements
to ensure that users of mobile phone services are identified. Mobile
phone service providers must identify and verify their contract and
non-contract clients in processes that mirror AML/CTF client
identification requirements. The policy objective behind these
registration requirements is to use the data for law enforcement
purposes and to prevent the abuse of these services by criminals.
The data generated through mobile phone usage is therefore linked
to a specific individual and can potentially provide a rich profile of
that user.
A Wikileaks/International Privacy release of a cache of
documents in 2011 showed that many large software companies
have developed and marketed mass surveillance software to
governments, including undemocratic and oppressive regimes. The
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software enables governments to combine, manage and mine
different sources of mass surveillance data and has been employed
in relation to mobile phone usage as well. 64
South Africa, one of the leading financial inclusion
jurisdictions, stands accused of extensive intelligence surveillance
of communications, both legal and, allegedly, illegal. 65 Despite a
modern constitution and rule of law, indications are that
communications are intercepted for political purposes. Leaked
recordings of taped telephone discussions of prosecutors, for
example, scuttled the corruption prosecution of the current
president of South Africa. South African mobile phone service
providers have furthermore not been protective of client privacy
when law enforcement requests information, sometimes releasing
information on the promise that due legal processes will be
followed and providing data of clients who are not subject to any
criminal investigation. 66
64

WIKILEAKS – THE SPY FILES, http://wikileaks.org/the-spyfiles.html.
“[T]he National Communications Centre (NCC) [is] an obscure, high tech
facility set up in Gauteng during the 1990s. By 2008 it boasted a staff
complement of some 300. The NCC’s telecommunications and computer
equipment can intercept and analyse [sic] large volumes of voice and [I]nternet
traffic, both indiscriminately by listening for keywords, and in a targeted way by
focusing on individual phone numbers, email addresses and even voice prints.
To date, the NCC has operated outside the bounds of national legislation,
including the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication-related Information Act (Rica), which allows interception only
with a judge's warrant. The NCC, has relied on the loophole that it supposedly
intercepts ‘foreign’ communications only, which is not regulated by domestic
law. However, in practice the NCC has defined ‘foreign signals’ to include
cross-border communications where one of the parties is in South Africa and the
other abroad. And because of the globalized nature of [I]nternet traffic, many
emails, voice-over-internet conversations and communication via social media
such as Facebook and Twitter - even if both end parties are in South Africa would also be susceptible.” Drew Forrest & Stefaans Brümmer, Spooks Bid for
New Powers, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Feb. 3, 2012, available at http://mg.co.za/
article/2012-02-03-spies-bid-for-new-powers.
66
This approach elicited a very strong judicial comment in S. v. Agliotti
2011 (2) SACR 437 (GSJ) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/
cases/ZAGPJHC/2010/129.html, an organized crime prosecution that failed,
amongst others because the integrity of mobile phone records was questionable.
The evidence revealed a cooperative and informal relationship between the
65
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AML/CFT systems can provide information that supports
appropriate law enforcement. Mobile money can improve the lives
of millions of vulnerable people in developing countries. However,
the good that these systems can do should not blind us to the
potential for abuse and the need for appropriate controls. Lack of
protection and lack of trust, on the other hand, may undermine the
usage of mobile money. For a variety of reasons, new users of
formal financial services often continue to use informal services in
parallel. Where users believe that their transactions may be
monitored to their detriment, they may withdraw from formal
services or use it only for transactions that can be monitored
without any negative result for them. 67 Such conduct would
continue to sustain the grey economy and undermine the proforensic investigators of telecommunications operators and law enforcement. It
highlighted instances where records were provided before due legal process was
followed; where large amounts of data were provided with no official being able
to account for the whereabouts or the use of the records; and the request and
provision of records of persons who had no involvement in criminal conduct,
including the records of the senior and highly respected counsel of the defense:
Judge Kgomo commented as follows:
Abuse of the system by the police was demonstrated by Hodes
SC during cross-examination of these cellphone ‘experts’. For
example, he elicited evidence to the effect that cellphone
records of the accused’s attorney; himself, Hodes SC,
accused’s counsel herein; his (Hodes’) father’s, also an
advocate who has nothing to do with this case; other clients of
accused’s counsel, Hodes SC like one Peter Skeet; phones of
private attorneys’ firms and private investigator Warren
Goldblatt; among many others, were subpoenaed and obtained
by the police from the cellphone companies. This elicited a
question from me at one stage to the effect whether if and
when this country’s State President’s phone records were
subpoenaed, whether they (the cellphone companies) would
issue them out without much ado. The answer was that those
records would be extracted and handed over without asking
another question. It is my considered view that if this state of
affairs did occur or does occur and is allowed to persist, WE
SHOULD ALL BE AFRAID, VERY AFRAID!!!
Id.
67
Louis de Koker & Nicola Jentzsch, Financial Inclusion and Financial
Integrity: Aligned Incentives? 18 (July 2011) (unpublished conference paper,
Univ. of Münster), available at http://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30041719.
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financial inclusion objectives of the FATF. Abusive practices will
also undermine the usage of mobile money when users discover
that their service providers shared damaging information that
exposed users to government repression.
Thus, appropriate protection of financial information should
receive more attention. Greater emphasis on privacy and
circumspection about the quality of governance in countries where
mobile money projects are launched will assist in protecting the
integrity of mobile money.
CONCLUSION
Mobile money holds much promise for the developing world.
However, it holds both good and bad. The FATF’s attention is
presently focused on the integrity consequences of mobile money
within its limited objectives of AML/CFT/PF. The FATF,
regulators and service providers still have some way to go before
clarity is reached about appropriate mobile money and risk
assessment and mitigation. However, there are also broader
integrity issues that are relevant to providers, consumers and
society at large that should be reflected in risk management
practices to ensure that mobile money functions with integrity in
all developing countries.

